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This paper aims to investigate the nature of aesthetic experience, focusing on 
the interplay between emotions and cognition. We shall establish a link between 
a phenomenological account of emotions and a pragmatist, anti-dogmatic view 
on aesthetics, such as that defended by John Dewey. Although pragmatism and 
phenomenology have historically emerged as separate traditions, they might 
mutually share resources to achieve an exhaustive description of aesthetic 
experience. Both traditions conceive aesthetics as a “philosophy of experience”, 
and they agree on the decisive role emotional intentionality plays in the 
constitution of an aesthetic experience.  
 “Aesthetics” is, to some extent, a problematic word. On the one hand, 
“aesthetics” might be connected to a logical-epistemological dimension, since 
it might be defined as “the science of sensible knowledge” in opposition to 
intellectual rationalism. On the other hand, “aesthetics” is the study of beauty 
in its various forms, intersecting with philosophy of art. In what follows, we 
shall accept this polysemy of aesthetics, without trying to force different 
senses of “aesthetic” under one constraining definition, providing a rather 
careful description of the wide territory and horizons that open up. Although 
the domain of aesthetics does not coincide with the domain of art – we might 
also formulate aesthetic judgements about nature (in front of a landscape, for 
instance) as well as non-aesthetic judgements about art (describing what a 
painting represents, or the technique applied, etc.) – we might take art as a 
paradigmatic case among aesthetic practices, one which highlights the 
essential features of any experience that might occur.  
Historically, pragmatism and phenomenology have emerged as separate 
traditions; however, these traditions might mutually share resources to 
achieve an exhaustive description of aesthetic experience. Firstly, we shall 
examine the relationship between pragmatism and phenomenology, focusing 
on how both perspectives defend continuity contra any dichotomy between 
Itinera, N. 15, 2018. Pagina 32 
 
mind/body, subject/object, emotion/cognition, value/fact. In this sense, both 
traditions consider aesthetics to be a “philosophy of experience”; although art 
often seems to exceed the context of human practices, it is not separate from 
the wider context of human activities and abilities, and cannot be considered 
isolated. Secondly, pragmatism and phenomenology agree on the decisive role 
emotions play on the constitution of aesthetic experience. 
Against Dualisms: The Role of Emotions 
In Experience and Nature, Dewey outlines a peculiar definition of experience, 
as interaction between living beings and nature, rejecting any empiricist 
account of experience as a chaotic flux of sense data1. Experience is rather a 
“rhythmic” interconnection of passivity and activity; things “out there” show 
themselves a peculiar autonomous organization, or a specific legality. Dewey 
agrees with Williams James’ rejection of atomistic and associationist 
principles, asserting that experience is not a mere collection of atomic data, 
extrinsically connected by the thinking subject. In this sense, any dichotomy 
between object and subject is devoid of any sense. Art develops precisely in 
this interplay of world and subject, making use of different languages and 
media. 
Similarly, phenomenologists pursue their research in two diverging yet 
intertwined directions. On the one hand, they analyse the feeling acts which 
characterize the aesthetic experience, while on the other hand, they examine 
the intentional object. Both the production and reception of a work of art are 
connected to the morphological structure of the work of art itself; only in this 
interaction between a feeling subject and a given object, does art unfold2. Art 
necessarily requires a subject that experiences the “object” in question, 
regardless of it being material or immaterial (as a performance or an idea). 
A significant point of connection between pragmatism and phenomenology 
is offered by the crucial role that emotions play in the construction of the 
aesthetic experience. According to Dewey, emotion and cognition are not 
                                                        
1 J. Dewey, Experience and Nature, (1925, 1929), in Later Works, I, ed. by J.A. Boydston, 
Southern Illinois University Press, Carbonsdale-Edwardsville 1981. 
2 For a thorough exploration of phenomenological aesthetics, see G. Scaramuzza, Sulle origini 
dell’estetica fenomenologica, Antenore, Padova 1976. 
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conceived as opposing psychological dimensions, but rather as intertwined 
abilities. For the pragmatist, the world around us affects us immediately; we 
are not abstract minds or disembodied consciousnesses, but rather living 
bodies who express through arts their freedom to define themselves. 
Emotions do not express anything private. They rather work as magnets that 
select and reorganize the material of experience3. The artwork, which results 
from the emotional rearrangement of the material, is something active, that 
does something. It is not an inert product and should not be seen in isolation 
from the process that produced it. In this sense, art «demonstrates the 
gratuitous falsity of notions that divide overt and executive activity from 
thought and feeling and thus separate mind and matter»4.  
An analogous intertwining of intellectual and emotional experiences is 
defended by phenomenologists. Although phenomenology is a diverse 
movement, it is nonetheless possible to identify a few unifying theses. More 
specifically, any phenomenological inquiry shares Brentano’s theory of 
intentionality5, according to which every psychological act – emotions 
included – are directed to an object. In this sense, the “aesthetic” lies in the 
interaction between a feeling subject and a value-object, a definition that 
deprives of any sense the traditional dichotomy between subject and object. 
From Husserl’s perspective, the aesthetic object cannot be conceived as a 
closed, self-sufficient entity, but it is rather the necessary correlate of an 
emotional intentional act. Indeed, Husserl expressed irritation against 
Roman Ingarden’s ontology of art, accusing it of being one-sided, since it 
neglected the subjective side of investigations6. We might identify, hence, two 
sides of any phenomenological investigation. On the one hand, we have the 
analysis of the object, of its structures and morphology 
(Gegenstandsphänomenologie); on the other hand, we find the analysis of the 
                                                        
3 J. Dewey, Art as Experience, in Later Works, I, ed. by J.A. Boydston, Southern Illinois 
University Press, Carbonsdale-Edwardsville 1989, p. 75. 
4 J. Dewey, Experience and Nature, cit., p. 293. 
5 See F. Brentano, Die Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Duncker & Humblot, 
Leipzig 1874; Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, translated by A.C. Rancurello, 
D.B. Terrell, and L. McAlister, Routledge, London 1973. 
6 For Ingarden’s view on the ontology of art, see R. Ingarden, Das literarische Kunstwerk, 
Niemeyer, Halle 1931. 
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psychological acts that are directed to the object (Aktphänomenologie). While 
Ingarden, Conrad and Hartmann, have favoured the object-analysis, Moritz 
Geiger, conversely, focused on the phenomenology of the act7. Nonetheless, 
they all rejected the traditional dichotomy between subject and object, 
defending their necessary interaction. Furthermore, against any alleged 
dichotomy, emotions are not opposing cognition as “irrational” states of mind. 
Emotions share the same structural intentionality of intellectual acts. 
Emotions intend a certain object; any given emotion has a formal object, 
which makes the emotion intelligible.  
For Dewey, too, the intentionality of emotions, i.e., their ability to be 
directed to a specific object, cannot be overlooked. «For emotion in its ordinary 
sense is something called out by objects, physical and personal; it is response 
to an objective situation»8. Emotion is, so to speak, «an attitude or disposition, 
which is a function of objective things»9.  
The Claim to Intersubjectivity 
Once we have assessed the role of emotions in our appreciation of a work of 
art, we might wonder as to whether the emotional perception of an artwork 
could hinder the possibility of formulating “objective” aesthetic value 
judgments. Indeed, if we take an empiricist account of emotions, emotions are 
represented as the most “irrational” part of human life; since emotions are 
thought to be primarily responsible for aesthetic experiences, their alleged 
idiosyncrasy seems to condemn them to be biased and partial. Furthermore, 
the widely accepted dichotomy between subject/object and values/facts, 
according to which only statements of facts are capable of being “objectively 
true”, seem to jeopardize their objectivity, insofar as value judgements do not 
seem to be empirically verifiable. From this perspective, aesthetic and ethical 
judgements seem to be meaningless if not bound to peculiar aesthetic or moral 
                                                        
7 In what follows we shall consider Meinong as a member of the phenomenological movement, 
insofar as he shares important phenomenological assumptions, namely the intentionality of 
psychological acts, developed by Brentano. For further details, see J.N. Findlay, “Meinong 
The Phenomenologist”, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, XXVII, 104/105 (2/3), 1973, 
pp. 161-177. 
8 J. Dewey, Experience and Nature, cit., p. 292. 
9 Ivi, p. 292. 
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properties. What, then, does actually mean to formulate an “objective” value 
judgement?  
While empiricist and rationalist philosophers have traditionally erected a 
separate “realm of values”, which they tried to reconcile with the realm of 
existence, for Dewey values permeate existence, and are immediately felt and 
possessed by the subject through emotions. Nonetheless, he claims that this 
immediate appraisal needs a critical justification, and this critical 
justification is what he defines an “aesthetic judgement”. An aesthetic 
judgment occurs whenever we want to see if we are justified in our 
experiencing something as elegant or beautiful, whenever we wonder if the 
«given value» might be «justified by reflection»10. Therefore, aesthetic 
judgements are not just a question of individual preference. From this anti-
relativist perspective, we might say that some judgements of beauty, 
elegance, or repulsiveness are more appropriate than others, insofar as we 
can provide reasons to support them. Any value judgement must have the 
possibility of being evaluated by other people. We need to provide reasons for 
our formulations11, making reference to a common external world with which 
we constantly interact. 
Similarly, from a phenomenological perspective the question of the 
objectivity of our value-judgements has been well investigated. Alexius 
Meinong assigns to emotional experiences a specific kind of intentionality12, 
by which emotions apprehend what we generally define as values – the good, 
the beautiful, the true, the pleasant. Insofar as the value is considered in its 
relation to an apprehending subject, we shall deal with “personal” values, 
while we may talk about “impersonal” values when we abstract from any 
apprehending subject. Thus, besides a “relative” and “personal” value, we can 
                                                        
10 Ivi, p. 301. 
11 For the idea of a shared “space of reasons”, see W. Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy 
of Mind, in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, H. Feigl, M. Scrivens (ed. by), vol. 
I, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1956; repr. in Empiricism and the Philosophy 
of Mind, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA) 1997. 
12 A. Meinong, Über emotionale Präsentation, (1917), in Gesamtausgabe, III; On Emotional 
Presentation, translated by M-L. Schubert Kalsi, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 
1972. Admittedly, Meinong does not use the word “intentionality”, using rather the words 
“direction” and “reference” to an object. For Meinong’s theory of intentionality, see 
C. Travanini, Oggetto e valore, Mimesis, Milano 2016. 
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also recognize an “impersonal” one, which belongs to the thing as such; 
impersonal beauty is independent from the variability of personal 
inclinations and tastes. How, then, can we get in touch with this impersonal 
value? A strong dichotomy emerges between the epistemic and the ontological 
level of our discourse on values. From an ontological point of view, Meinong 
is certain that there are impersonal, absolute values, which subsist 
independently from our thinking processes. However, from an epistemic point 
of view, it is apparent that we have no direct access to them. This means, that 
in daily life we have to follow an indirect path to reach impersonal values; 
indeed, only practical experience might tell us whether a certain aesthetic 
value is correctly attached to a given object, and whether our aesthetic 
judgment is correct. We need to consider the circumstances in which an 
emotion occurs, and we also need to rationally confront with other agents. In 
this view, “objective” judgements need interpersonal agreement; they need to 
be tested and shared.   
We find, hence, a public, objective dimension of our aesthetic judgements. 
In the background, it seems that an intersubjective horizon opens up, insofar 
as the notion of correctness requires shared criteria of legitimation within a 
certain social community. 
Both phenomenology and pragmatism challenge Kant’s insistence that 
there is an alternative to the rationalist and empiricist views, one in which 
judgements of beauty are subjective and singular and make a claim to 
universal validity. With his Antinomy of Taste (§ 56), Kant holds that an 
authentic aesthetic judgement implies the possibility of obtaining 
argumentatively (not demonstratively) other people’s approbation. The 
judgement of taste is allowed to claim subjective validity, since it is based on 
a Gemeinsinn, on a common sense, that permits us to communicate with 
others13. In this sense, the objectivity claimed by aesthetic judgements is 
rather a form of intersubjectivity. 
                                                        
13 I. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, in Kants gesammelte Schriften, Bd. III, 1790; Critique of 
the Power of Judgment, translated by P. Guyer and E. Matthews, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2000. 
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Likewise, phenomenologists defend the idea of the correctness of our 
aesthetic value judgements, while insisting on a distance from a dogmatic 
realist view on values. Even within a strong realist account of values, such as 
that of Alexius Meinong, we end up taking into account pragmatic factors. An 
impersonal value is ontologically determined, but epistemically largely 
incomplete. What our emotions do give us is the general form of value. How, 
exactly, an objective, “absolute” value is attached to objects is not a question 
we can resolve a priori, but one that requires reference to a plurality of 
empirical factors. In daily life, we need to rationally confront other agents. 
Objective value judgements need interpersonal agreement; they need to be 
shared.  
Dewey also rejects any form of dogmatism; an aesthetic value judgement 
always entails a certain hypothetical element and, hence, a certain risk of 
being wrong. According to him, an aesthetic judgment is objective insofar as 
we are able to provide generally available reasons in order to justify it. These 
must be reasons that can be tested by other persons in their direct 
relationship with a public, shared object. An aesthetic judgment is therefore 
“objective” in the sense that it can be checked by others, to whom the same 
objective material is available. While formulating our value judgements, we 
always need to make reference to our own experiences, as the work of art 
becomes a part of our experience. An interaction occurs between the object’s 
structure and our past, sensibility, and knowledge. We do not have any 
general rules, prescriptions, or quantitative standards which could possibly 
guarantee the correctness of our aesthetic judgements. Nonetheless, since we 
insist on the public qualities of a work of art, others who have the same 
material at their disposal can evaluate our judgement. In this sense, the 
aesthetic value judgement can be defined as “objective”, insofar as it demands 
to be shared, in virtue of the common world we are all in. There are not any 
objects or properties of objects «which carry their own adequate credentials 
upon their face»14. This is «the delusion of the whole historic tradition 
                                                        
14 J. Dewey, Experience and Nature, cit., p. 303. 
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regarding knowledge, infecting alike sensational and rational schools, 
objective realisms and introspective idealisms»15.  
Phenomenology and pragmatism share, thus, this same claim to 
intersubjectivity for our aesthetic value judgements. To define an object as 
“beautiful” always requires the exercise of rational, logical and emotional 
abilities, which characterize the human means of experiencing the world in 
general. Indeed, experience is «the fulfilment of an organism in its struggles 
and achievements in a world of things, it is art in germ»16. 
 
Cooperation between pragmatism and phenomenology becomes, hence, 
significant for our understanding of the complexity of aesthetics, and for 
reshaping our concept of objectivity into one that is not opposed to 
subjectivity. From phenomenology, we have learnt that the ascription of 
objectivity to an aesthetic judgment always requires a subject that feels a 
certain value, revealing new aspects of things. As intentional acts, emotions 
and values are not separable entities, and the aesthetic lies in this very 
interaction of the two polarities. Accordingly, the dichotomy between subject 
and object blurs, and the same happens to the idea that “subjective” means 
“biased” or “partial”. We rather found out that “objectivity” is not separable 
from the concept of subjectivity, intended not only in a first-person 
perspective, but also – as suggested by Dewey – in a “we” perspective (first 
person plural perspective). As Dewey pointed out, an aesthetic judgement 
makes sense within a community of people who share a common world of 
beliefs, emotional attitudes and concepts. It remains a question open to 
further investigation how exactly to circumscribe the particular community 
we belong to, and how to define the conditions of membership. 
                                                        
15 Ibidem. 
16 J. Dewey, Art as Experience, cit., p. 25. 
